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Distributed Constraint Optimization Problems (DCOPs) are a powerful tool to model multi-agent coordination problems that are distributed by nature. The formulation is suitable for problems where variables are discrete and constraint utilities are ...
Several methods exist for electing committees of representatives and conducting multiple referenda based on approval voting. Recently, a family of rules for approval-based voting using ordered weighted averaging was proposed, ranging from a simple ...
We investigate markets with a set of students on one side and a set of colleges on the other. A student and college can be linked by a weighted contract that defines the student's wage, while a college's budget for hiring students is limited. Stability ...
Although minimum quotas are important in many real-world markets, existing strategyproof mechanisms require an unrealistic assumption that all students consider all schools acceptable (and vice-versa). We develop a strategyproof matching mechanism ...
Current approaches that model dynamism in DCOPs solve a sequence of static problems, reacting to changes in the environment as the agents observe them. Such approaches thus ignore possible predictions on future changes. To overcome this limitation, we ...
Sequential allocation is one of the most fundamental models for allocating indivisible items to agents in a decentralized manner, in which agents sequentially pick their favorite items among the remainder based on a pre-defined priority ordering of ...
This paper develops a strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism for a school choice program called Top Trading Cycles among Representatives with Supplementary Seats (TTCR-SS). We consider a setting where minimum quotas are imposed for each school, ...
This paper considers matching problems with hierarchical regional minimum quotas. Although such quotas are relevant in many real-world settings, it is known that nonwastefulness and fairness (which compose stability) are incompatible when minimum quotas ...
This paper proposes an alternative automated mechanism design approach called parametric mechanism design via quantifier elimination (PMD-QE), which utilizes QE, a symbolic formula manipulation technique. In PMD-QE, we start from a skeleton of ...
Cake cutting has been recognized as a fundamental model in fair division and several envy-free cake cutting algorithms have been proposed Recent works from the computer science field proposed novel mechanisms for cake cutting, whose approaches are based ...
We study the problem where a group of agents need to choose from a finite set of social outcomes. We assume every agent's valuation for every outcome is bounded and the bounds are public information. For our model, no mechanism simultaneously satisfies ...
This paper considers the matching problem with regional quotas, in particular, regional minimum quotas. Although such quotas are relevant in many real-world settings, there is a lack of strategy-proof mechanisms that consider regional minimum quotas. We ...
The class of Groves mechanisms has been attracting much attention in called social welfare maximization) and dominant strategy incentive compatibility. However, when strategic agents can create multiple fake identities and reveal more than one ...
This paper proposes a novel market-based system for ridesharing, where commuters are matched based on their declared travel constraints, the number of available seats (which could be zero), and their costs. Based on this information, the system then ...
Although the celebrated Vickrey auction is strategy-proof and guaranteed to achieve an efficient allocation in a single-object auction, if there exists no outside party (i.e., a seller or an auctioneer) with the right to collect the payment, the ...
When forming the grand coalition is not possible/optimal, agents need to create a coalition structure. The idea of the core can be extended to such a case. In this paper, we propose an innovative algorithm called CoreD to check core-non-emptiness for ...
In this paper, we develop a new class of iterative mechanisms called a VC equivalent in expectation mechanism. Iterative auctions are preferred over their sealed-bid counterparts in practical settings, since they can avoid full revelation of type ...
We consider the problem of allocating objects to agents when the objects have minimum quotas. There exist many real-world settings where minimum quotas are relevant. For example, in a hospital-resident matching problem, unconstrained matching may ...
The present paper investigates repeated games with imperfect private monitoring, where each player privately receives a noisy observation (signal) of the opponent's action. Such games have been paid considerable attention in the AI and economics ...
A Coalition Structure Generation (CSG) problem involves partitioning a set of agents into coalitions so that the social surplus is maximized. Recently, Ohta et al. developed an efficient algorithm for solving CSG assuming that a characteristic function ...